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Getting Outside Help
How Trust Problems Explain
Household Differences in Domestic
Outsourcing in the Netherlands
Esther de Ruijter
Arbeid Opleidingen Consult, Tilburg, Netherlands
Tanja van der Lippe
Utrecht University, Netherlands
This article examines the influence of trust problems on the use of domestic
outsourcing by couples from a gender perspective. The authors argue that
trust problems matter in outsourcing decisions, because an outsider enters the
privacy of the household and takes over tasks of special value. Analyses of
data from a survey among 740 Dutch couples show that trust problems faced
by female partners influence the outsourcing of female tasks, and the same
reasoning applies to male partners. Partners who are more trusting toward
others are more likely to outsource own-gender tasks. Conversely, greater
skills reduce the trust problem for opposite-gender tasks, that is, men’s skills
increase the likelihood of outsourcing child care, whereas women’s skills
increase the outsourcing of home maintenance.
Keywords: domestic outsourcing; trust; gender; transaction costs
Agrowing body of research focuses on domestic outsourcing (Bittman,Matheson, & Meagher, 1999) as an alternative for own household
labor. Examples of outsourcing are the use of services of cleaners, handy-
men, babysitters, day care centers, takeaway restaurants, and so forth. The
increase in the interest for domestic outsourcing is an obvious extension of
the well-developed literature on the household division of labor, with the
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focus being shifted from the division of labor between partners toward the
division of labor between the household and third parties. Previous studies
were typically inspired by the notion of outsourcing as a time-saving strat-
egy for harried households trying to meet the demands of both the home
and paid work (Bellante & Foster, 1984; Brayfield, 1995; Cohen, 1998;
Hanson & Ooms, 1991; Oropesa, 1993; Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991).
Researchers generally assume that households with less available time out-
source their tasks relatively more often, but empirical evidence does not
consistently support this view (see de Ruijter, van der Lippe, & Raub, 2003,
for an overview).
This study examines the role of trust in household outsourcing. Previous
studies neglected the fact that hiring outside help for domestic work is of a
different nature than dividing household tasks between partners. For one
thing, whereas the division of domestic work and caring tasks between part-
ners takes place within the context of family loyalty, which overrules the
unbridled pursuit of self-interest (Pollak, 1985), the outsourcing of house-
hold tasks to outsiders involves substantial trust problems that may deter
households from outsourcing. The outsourcing supplier is less concerned
with the welfare of the household than the household members are, and the
supplier may perform household tasks unsatisfactorily. Households hiring
domestic help are often “particularly worried about the theft of household
items” (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001, p. 78), whereas parents hiring a babysit-
ter may even fear kidnapping of their babies, physical abuse, or that the
children are left to watch television. Moreover, family loyalties are created,
among others, by performing domestic tasks. Domestic labor is not just
work but also an expression of social bonds (e.g., Ahlander & Bahr, 1995;
DeVault, 1991). Therefore, the explanation of third-party involvement calls
for a more subtle approach than a mere transfer of ideas on the division of
labor within households. Naturally, theories on the division of household
labor can be of aid in the study of domestic outsourcing, but the trust prob-
lems have to be taken into account as well.
In household outsourcing, an outsider comes to perform domestic tasks
for the household, which means that the privacy of the household is invaded
in two major ways. First, the supplier of the outsourcing service often phys-
ically enters the home, even at times when there are no household members
present. Domestic cleaners, for instance, generally work unsupervised
and alone. Second, the outsourcing supplier (partially) takes over tasks of
special value to the household. It is important that suppliers of outsourcing
services can be trusted within the private sphere of the household, especially
4 Journal of Family Issues
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when it comes to special tasks such as child care. Trust is a very important
issue for parents when “hiring someone for this ‘labor of love’”(Hondagneu-
Sotelo, 2001, p. 68).
We combine insights from the trust literature and family sociology to
explain household outsourcing. The role of trust has been studied extensively
in organization research, focusing mainly on the choice between own produc-
tion and market exchange (make-or-buy decisions). These studies have shown
that trust problems may cause firms to refrain from market transactions (e.g.,
Masten, 1996; Monteverde & Teece, 1996; see Shelanski & Klein, 1995, for an
overview). Households are faced with similar decisions between own domestic
labor and outsourcing. However, we cannot simply transfer insights from the
trust literature to the household because organization studies typically consider
firms as collective entities. In family research, the assumption of households as
single entities is problematic. The interests of female and male partners in
households often differ, which has consequences for, among others, the divi-
sion of household labor (e.g., Hochschild, 1989; Shelton & John, 1993).
Outsourcing studies showed that gender affects the types of tasks surrendered
to outsiders (Cohen, 1998; de Ruijter, Treas, & Cohen, 2005; Oropesa, 1993).
Trust problems could in fact be more salient for the study of household
outsourcing than the economic exchange between firms, because norms or
feelings of privacy play an important role. The consequences of potential
problems are more far-reaching for households than firms, especially when
it comes to outsourcing the care for young children. For this reason, trust
problems may be of even greater value for the explanation of household out-
sourcing than for the exchange between firms. Obviously, trust issues are
very important in firm relations as well. In the explanation of other types of
household behavior, for example, making financial arrangements in intimate
relationships, the application of this approach to the household proved suc-
cessful (e.g., Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2000; Pollak, 1985; Treas, 1991, 1993).
In this article we study how trust influences outsourcing of both female
and male tasks from a gender perspective. We argue that trust problems
matter in outsourcing decisions, because an outsider enters the privacy of
the household and takes over tasks of special value. We analyze data of a
survey among 740 Dutch couples to test our hypotheses on the effects of
gender-specific trust problems on the outsourcing of four particular house-
hold tasks, namely home maintenance, cleaning, child care, and cooking.
We additionally test hypotheses from the family literature on the benefits of
outsourcing as a time-saving strategy.
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 5
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Literature Review
Trust Problems
The trust literature can offer insight into the outsourcing behavior of
households. The basic idea is that both the likelihood and the potential con-
sequences of trust problems influence the expected costs of buying a prod-
uct or service (Williamson, 1981, 1985). Firms can protect themselves from
problems by choosing a certain governance structure, such as the detailed
contractual planning of a transaction, or by looking for a reliable partner,
which is accompanied by so-called transaction costs. These costs have to be
made to prevent and solve problems of trust. The properties of a transaction
determine which governance structure is the least costly (Coase, 1937/1952;
Williamson, 1981, 1985). The most basic distinction can be drawn between
the purchase of a service or good on the market and the use of own produc-
tion (hierarchy): the make-or-buy decision (e.g., Masten, 1996; Monteverde
& Teece, 1996; Walker & Weber, 1984). If a firm is more likely to encounter
problems when entering a transaction on the market and the damage it can
suffer is higher, the firm will incur higher transaction costs to prevent prob-
lems. If more trust problems are involved, firms are more likely to opt for
own production. A relatively large amount of attention has been devoted to
make-or-buy decisions by firms in the transaction cost literature (e.g.,
Masten, 1996; Monteverde & Teece, 1996; Walker & Weber, 1984).
Just as firms can choose between the purchase of a service or product
and the use of own production, so do households face similar make-or-buy
decisions between their own domestic labor and outsourcing. Because the
outsourcing supplier is not embedded in the context of family loyalty, the
supplier’s behavior may have undesirable consequences for the household.
To prevent problems, households may require references, place surveillance
cameras, engage in trial transactions, pay surprise visits, and so forth (see
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001). The costs of solving problems involve, for
example, replacing the costly vase broken by the housecleaner or the costs
of repainting the house if the handyman has used low-quality paint. These
costs decrease the relative attractiveness of outsourcing. Some of these
costs are incurred at one point in time, which is mainly the case if house-
holds engage in an outsourcing relation with a supplier, for instance when
deciding to hire someone to clean the house. Outsourcing tasks to different
suppliers, such as the outsourcing of cooking, involves recurrent costs.
Next to trust related to transaction costs, trust theory (Yamagishi, 1986)
claims that people differ in the extent to which they trust others. General
6 Journal of Family Issues
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trust is a belief “in the benevolence of human nature in general” (Yamagishi
& Yamagishi, 1994, p. 139). According to this theory, people with a higher
level of general trust are more likely to engage in relations with people out-
side their safe environment, such as the family context. Empirical evidence
supports this claim (e.g., Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998). The underly-
ing reasoning is that trust in others reduces the extent to which people have
to incur costs to solve and prevent problems, making outsourcing a more
attractive alternative compared to own household labor. A higher level of
trust makes it easier for people to discharge their household tasks to people
outside their safe family context.
Keeping domestic labor and care within the boundaries of the household
also involves costs that have to be made to prevent and solve problems of
coordination; transaction costs are incurred to “reduce day-to-day hassles
of negotiating and coordinating exchanges (i.e. to avoid distasteful hag-
gling, minimize unpleasant disputes, eliminate awkward misunderstand-
ings, cut down the time wasted policing the performance of others)” (Treas,
1993, p. 724). These costs of own household labor and care are higher when
there are bigger coordination problems to deal with. Coordination problems
are more likely to arise when multiple roles at work and in the family have
to be synchronized (e.g., Voydanoff, 1987, 1988). Also, synchronizing the
roles of multiple family members requires coordination—increasing the
costs of own household labor.
Our argument does not imply that the quality of “formal” outsourcing
alternatives (e.g., professional services) in general is lower than the quality
of work done by a family member. For instance, most parents would expect
a cleaning service to do a better quality job cleaning their teenager’s room
than teenagers themselves. However, in the case of formal outsourcing,
households need to invest more in transaction costs to prevent problems
(e.g., choosing a supplier who offers safeguards such as quality marks or
guarantees). If a household does not incur these costs and opts for a cheap
supplier, the consequences of outsourcing can be harmful for the house-
hold. Households probably put more trust in family members, embedded in
the context of family loyalty, than in a third, unknown party, which
decreases the relative costs of own household labor.
We also do not claim that households have to choose between own labor
and outsourcing, given the amount of housework and care. Of course,
households may use alternative strategies to reduce their own time invest-
ments in domestic work. They can either outsource or do less work. Owing
to women’s entrance to the laborforce, women have less time available for
housework. Research has shown that the time women devote to household
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 7
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work has declined since the 1960s (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson,
2000). Men pick up only part of the slack: Although international data show
that men’s time investment in domestic work has increased since the 1960s
at a slow rate (Barnett & Baruch, 1987; Gershuny, Godwin, & Jones, 1994;
Sayer, 2005), women still carry the majority of the domestic workload
(Bianchi et al., 2000; Presser, 1994; Sayer, 2005). Households cannot
afford to pay for outsourcing tasks beyond the basic necessities, and time
spent in the private sphere is now spent with children as opposed to house-
work. It seems that less housework overall is getting done. In general, we
expect that trust problems will affect households’ outsourcing decisions—
although, of course, alternative strategies are available to some extent.
Gender Influences
A man who earns less than his wife may not be counted on to do more
housework so his wife can focus on her job (Brines, 1994). This contradicts
not only the comparative advantage logic of economic specialization but also
the exchange theory argument that resources (e.g., income) give wives power.
Even in dual-earner families, wives carry the majority of family responsibili-
ties (Presser, 1994), although men do increase their share when the wife con-
tributes a larger portion of household income (Bianchi et al., 2000). However,
when focusing on total time spent on paid and unpaid work, women are spend-
ing more time in work activities than men and, as a result, a 30-minute-
per-day free-time gap has emerged (Sayer, 2005). Although higher income
increases outsourcing, men’s and women’s earnings influence outsourcing
behavior differently (Oropesa, 1993). Regarding the outsourcing of cleaning,
a wife’s earnings have more weight than her husband’s (Oropesa, 1993), just
as a wife’s earnings have the larger effect on her time spent in housework
(Bianchi et al., 2000; van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994). Husband’s and wife’s
incomes have comparable effects on dining out, which offers a recreational
experience as well as an alternative to culinary work at home (Oropesa, 1993).
The gender-typing of tasks should be taken into account as well (Blair
& Lichter, 1991; Presser, 1994). Routine domestic chores, such as laundry
and cleaning, more often fall to women. On the other hand, occasional
tasks, such as maintenance and yard care, are usually seen as men’s respon-
sibility (Hochschild, 1989). Bianchi et al. (2000) distinguish between core
housework (cooking, meal cleanup, housecleaning, laundry) and less time-
intensive, discretionary tasks (outdoor chores, repairs, garden care, animal
care, bill paying). Between 1965 and 1995, women dominated the core
tasks, and men increased their time doing male-oriented chores.
8 Journal of Family Issues
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In addition, one should distinguish between tasks that have always been
common to outsource and tasks that have been performed within the house-
hold. Many household tasks were previously done by women on an unpaid
basis, making the barrier for outsourcing higher. Certain tasks, such as food
preparation, have more often been paid for on some level, whereas clean-
ing the house or looking after the children were usually unpaid activities
performed by women. The costs of outsourcing these previously never paid
for services are somewhat higher.
So, because people are integrated in wider systems of economic and polit-
ical power (Blumberg, 1984; Ferree, 1990), macrolevel gender structures and
ideologies provide roadmaps for gendered behavior. Sustained by broader
social structures and intimate power relations, expectations for gendered
behavior influence the division of housework between partners in couple
households as well as the type of domestic work they outsource to third par-
ties. According to the gender production perspective, gender is created sym-
bolically, “a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (West
& Zimmerman, 1987, p. 125). Produced through interactive behaviors—such
as household labor—that are linked to gender, gender need not operate on a
conscious level (Berk, 1985). Partners embrace own-gender tasks and avoid
other-gender tasks. A man in a heterosexual couple will avoid feminine chores
but perform masculine tasks for his female partner. A woman will perform
women’s work about the house and avoid stereotypically male chores.
Because women and men carry the responsibility for different types of tasks,
it can be expected that they likewise maintain their responsibility for the out-
sourcing of tasks. Because household tasks are gender-typed, measures of trust
problems need to be disaggregated into gender-specific measures.
Previous Outsourcing Research
Family studies offer two main explanations that focus on outsourcing as
a beneficial strategy to cope with domestic duties and care, by replacing
unpaid household labor with market substitutes. The benefits of outsourc-
ing are assumed to depend on households’ available time and the demands
of domestic work and care. The time availability explanation (Hiller, 1984)
argues that time claims from work increase the outsourcing benefits,
because time spent in paid employment reduces the available time for work
at home. The time availability hypothesis can be viewed from the perspec-
tive of the trust literature. For instance, a more time-consuming job will
increase the coordination costs of combining multiple roles at work and
home, thus making outsourcing a more attractive alternative.
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 9
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In most studies, the expected relation was found for food away from home
and child care (Bellante & Foster, 1984; Bittman et al., 1999; Kim, 1989;
Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991; Tijdens, van der Lippe, & de Ruijter, 2000;
Yen, 1993). However, most studies did not find that less available time
increases the use of housekeeping services (Bellante & Foster, 1984; Soberon-
Ferrer & Dardis, 1991). Oropesa (1993) did find the expected relationship, but
this effect was explained in multivariate models by the wife’s income.
According to the demand capability argument (Coverman, 1985), the
benefits of outsourcing are higher if there are more children in the house-
hold because more work has to be done—although, of course, there may be
some scale benefits. Also, households with young children are faced with a
relatively large amount of child care and domestic tasks (e.g., children’s
laundry) and therefore have a higher demand for outsourcing. The demand
capability hypothesis can be viewed from the trust literature as well. A
larger volume of housework, usually indicated by the number of children
and children’s age, increases the demands of the family role and the rela-
tive costs of coordination problems. These higher transaction costs within
the household make outsourcing more likely. Some studies found that
young children affect the use of outsourcing alternatives such as house-
cleaning (Bittman et al., 1999), but others did not find an effect (Cohen,
1998; Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991; Zick & McCullough, 1996).
In addition, high-income households are more likely to use outsourcing
alternatives than low-income households (Bellante & Foster, 1984; Bittman
et al., 1999; Cohen, 1998; Oropesa, 1993; Spitze, 1999). Home owners have a
higher demand for maintenance and domestic help (Oropesa, 1993). Women
with higher education make more use of housekeeping services, if not pre-
pared food (Bellante & Foster, 1984; Cohen, 1998; Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis,
1991; van der Lippe, Tijdens, & de Ruijter, 2004; Yen, 1993). Some studies
found that age is associated with a higher likelihood of the outsourcing of
cleaning and that older people dine out less often (Bittman et al., 1999; Cohen,
1998), but others did not find age differences (Zick & McCullough, 1996).
The Dutch Context
In the Netherlands, many women face problems combining work and
home and can benefit from outsourcing household tasks. The labor force
participation of women has increased rapidly over the last few decades
(Tijdens et al., 2000). Nowadays, 77% of women in the age category 25 to
54 participate in the labor market, which is slightly higher than the average
female participation rate in Europe of 75% (European Commission, 2004).
10 Journal of Family Issues
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Among European member states, the Netherlands stands out as the country
where part-time employment is most common: 74% of Dutch working
women have a part-time job, whereas the average share of part-time work-
ing women in Europe is 31% (European Commission, 2004). The large
increase in female labor force participation has not led to a substantial
increase in the amount of domestic work by their male partners. Dutch
women still perform twice as much domestic work than men (Tijdens et al.,
2000). Therefore, the demand for outsourcing in the Netherlands is high
(Cancedda, 2001). In the last few decades there has been an increase in the
outsourcing of domestic tasks (domestic help, restaurant visits) and child
care (de Ruijter, 2004). The Dutch service sector is expanding and house-
hold expenditures on services have nearly doubled over the past decade
(Statline Statistics Netherlands, 2004).
Hypotheses
We consider the influence of trust problems on household outsourcing. If
more trust problems are involved with outsourcing, households need to incur
more costs to prevent problems and therefore are less likely to opt for out-
sourcing. The likelihood of trust problems depends on (a) job flexibility, (b)
domestic skills, (c) quality standards, and (d) general level of trust (de Ruijter,
2005; Yamagishi, 1986). Instead of focusing on the household level, the trust
characteristics of female and male partners are expected to influence the out-
sourcing of own-gender tasks, implying that characteristics of the female
partner influence the outsourcing of female tasks. The same reasoning holds
for men. It should be noted that we expect that trust problems are especially
relevant for caring tasks, because the consequences of potential problems can
be far worse in the case of child care compared with domestic tasks. For
instance, the damage if a domestic help breaks a vase is much lower than the
damage caused if something goes wrong at the day care center.
Job Flexibility
Job flexibility allows household members to stay at home to observe the
efforts of the outsourcing supplier, such as, for instance, whether the house-
cleaner works the agreed number of hours. If observation is not possible,
the household is less likely to outsource. Both flexible work schedules and
working from home allow for monitoring the supplier. If employees can
determine their own working hours, they can decide to start late so that they
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 11
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do not have to give their keys to the supplier or even to stay at home for the
entire time that the supplier is at work. Working from home also allows
employees to be at home to observe the supplier.
For certain tasks, supervision of the supplier’s efforts is not an option, and
job flexibility only influences the outsourcing of tasks that have to be per-
formed in the home, such as housecleaning and maintenance (de Ruijter et al.,
2003). The outsourcing of cooking and child care outside the home lies beyond
the bounds of observation. Also, if a child care provider had to be supervised
continuously, outsourcing would not be necessary in most cases. Because the
responsibility for household tasks depends on the gender-typing of tasks, it can
be expected that the job flexibility of both partners influences the outsourcing
of own-gender tasks. That is, women will stay home to monitor the house-
cleaner, whereas men’s flexibility allows them to watch the handyman.
Hypothesis 1: More job flexibility of female and male partners increases the likeli-
hood of outsourcing home-based, own-gender tasks.
Domestic Skills
Households may also face difficulties in judging the quality of the work as
a consequence of lack of own skills. If household members have more skills
in a certain task, they are better able to judge the quality of the supplier’s
work—even if they cannot observe the supplier. If more specialized tasks are
involved, however, it may be impossible to judge the quality of the supplier’s
work. For example, it is relatively easy to check whether the housecleaner has
cleaned the bathroom, without any monitoring being necessary, but judging
the work of a plumber who has repaired a leakage can be more difficult, even
under direct observation. For obvious reasons, “skilled” households are less
likely to outsource because they can perform certain tasks themselves at a rel-
atively low price. Skills reduce the time needed to perform a task.
We expect that the skills of partners influence the outsourcing of own-
gender tasks. Women will judge the quality of the outsourcing service for
female tasks whereas men judge male tasks, in part, to show their respec-
tive femininity or masculinity. Perhaps men with fewer maintenance skills
than their female partner may even avoid having their skilled wife judging
the quality of the supplier’s work in order to avoid loss of face. It should be
noted, however, that the advantage of judging the quality of the work may
be offset by the low costs of own household production.
Hypothesis 2: Higher skill levels of female and male partners increase the likelihood
of outsourcing own-gender tasks.
12 Journal of Family Issues
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Quality Standards
Quality standards reflect the level of performance that household
members will tolerate (Bianchi et al., 2000). If households have higher qual-
ity standards, trust problems are more likely simply because it is more diffi-
cult to meet their standards. In addition, the outsourcing of tasks by
households with high standards requires informing the supplier about the
required quality level of the service, which increases the costs of outsourcing.
For instance, if strict cleanliness is regarded as essential, the household will
have to instruct the supplier carefully and may have to search longer for a
suitable housecleaner. Parents may have to invest time and effort in explain-
ing to the babysitter that they do not want their children to watch television
or eat unhealthy snacks. Quality standards also influence the consequences of
potential trust problems. If a task is not performed properly, the consequences
are worse for households with higher standards. If a home maintenance sup-
plier has delivered a poor painting job, households with high maintenance
standards may invest in repainting the house whereas a household with low
standards may even be satisfied with the work. Again, we mainly expect an
influence of the partner’s standards for own-gender tasks.
Hypothesis 3: Higher quality standards of female and male partners decrease the
likelihood of outsourcing own-gender tasks.
General Level of Trust
Households differ in the extent to which they think that suppliers may
behave in an undesirable way. People with a high general level of trust are
more likely to have faith in a supplier than low trusters, because they think
it unlikely that the supplier will take advantage of them. The more trusting
households are, the lower the perceived likelihood of trust problems and the
lower the costs associated with outsourcing, and the more likely it is that
outsourcing services will be sought.
Hypothesis 4: A higher general level of trust of female and male partners increases
the likelihood of outsourcing own-gender tasks.
Method
Data were collected by means of a multistage sample of employees of
30 Dutch firms. Home interviews were conducted with 1,114 employees
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 13
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
and, if applicable, their partners at a response rate of 29%. The response
rate seems reasonable if we take into account that response rates in the
Netherlands for interviews at home vary from 25% to 45% in national prob-
ability samples (van der Lippe & Glebbeek, 2003). We focus on couple
households, leaving 819 cases. Both partners were interviewed and they filled
in written questionnaires. After excluding cases with missing values on our
main explanatory and dependent variables, eventually 740 cases are included
in the analyses (323 couples with children under age 13 in child care analy-
ses). Slightly more than 70% of all couples in our sample are married, which
is a relatively higher figure than in Dutch society. There is an intentional over-
representation of dual-earner couples in the sample, because the data were
collected specifically to study the causes of and solutions to work–home
interference (van der Lippe & Glebbeek, 2003). As a consequence, the
respondents’ educational level is relatively high as well; 57% of the respon-
dents have some college education or more compared to 28% nationally.
Because of the sampling method, the sample is not representative.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the outsourcing of several dif-
ferent household tasks: (a) cleaning, (b) home maintenance, (c) child care
for children younger than 13, and (d) cooking. To measure the outsourcing
of cleaning, the female partner was asked during the face-to-face interview
whether the household receives help with cleaning from a housecleaner,
housecleaning company, family, or friends and, if so, how many hours on
average per week or month for each supplier. For home maintenance, the
male partner was asked whether the household received help from home
maintenance suppliers (handymen and firms) and family and friends during
the past 12 months and, if so, how many days or hours per year for each
supplier. Female partners were also asked whether the household received
help with child care from babysitters, day care centers, afterschool care,
host parents, family, friends, and, if so, how many hours or days on average
per month for each supplier. The female partner was asked questions about
the household’s average number of restaurant visits, cafeteria visits, and
purchases of takeaway and preprepared food per month.
Because outsourcing involves trust problems regardless of the number of
hours or times of outsourcing and because our outsourcing measures for
cleaning, home maintenance, and child care are extremely skewed, the
dependent variables for these three tasks simply measure whether a house-
hold outsources for a task (1) or not (0). Almost all households outsource
cooking to some extent; for this reason, the monthly frequency was used.
To measure earner type, dummy variables for one-and-a-half earners
(47%, one partner works 32 hours or more, the other works between 8 and
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32 hours) and double earners (35%, both work 32 hours or more) are
included. We use 32 hours as the division between part-time and full-time,
because 32 hours per week is considered full-time in the Netherlands. These
variables are constructed using both partners’ factual average number of
working hours per week. The one-and-a-half earners are almost all tradi-
tional one-and-a-half earners (the male works full-time and the female part-
time). Couples with one earner (n = 110) or two part-time earners (n = 17)
are the reference category. Virtually all single-earner couples are traditional,
meaning that the male partner participates on the labor market. Including a
separate dummy for two part-time earners did not change the results.
To measure the relative share of the female partner in household work
(in percentages), both partners were asked to report the average time they
themselves spend on household activities per week. We added time spent
on grocery shopping, cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, home maintenance
(chores, repairs), and administration for the entire week and calculated the
share of the female partner relative to the total amount of time spent by the
male and female partner. For reasons of social desirability, respondents may
be inclined to overestimate the time they spend on housework. This is not
problematic if both partners report an overestimation, because we calculate
the relative share of the female partner. We also include the number of
children younger than 13.
We include two measures for job flexibility. Dummies for working from
home were included for the female and male partner, with a value of 1 if
the person occasionally works from home. Flexibility of women’s and
men’s work schedule was measured with two questions from the interview,
namely, (a) how easy is it to take a day off or to work from home when an
unexpected domestic event has taken place (0 = not possible; 4 = easily pos-
sible), and (b) who determines the beginning and end times at work (0 =
usually someone else; 4 = only me). This variable has value 0 if the person
does not have a job. A higher value indicates more flexibility.
To measure skills, the respondents were asked to judge themselves and
their partner (if any) on a scale from 1 to 10 with respect to their skills in
cleaning, cooking, home maintenance, and child care in the written ques-
tionnaire. The male partner was asked these questions about home mainte-
nance, and the female partner was asked about cleaning, cooking, and child
care. We tried to minimize the risk of social desirability by asking these
questions in the written questionnaire instead of the face-to-face interview.
The skill levels of the female and male partner were included in the analy-
ses. We tested for nonlinear effects with quadratic terms (only significant
quadratic effects reported), because differences in trust problems may be
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especially large for couples with relatively low skills. Couples with fairly
high skill levels may be just as capable to judge the output as highly skilled
couples. In general, people judged their skills highest for child care, with
an average of 8.32 for women and 7.94 for men, whereas the skills for
home maintenance were lowest for female partners, although still reason-
able, with an average of 6.23. Men had the lowest skills for cleaning, with
an average of 6.64.
Both the female and male partner were asked about their quality stan-
dards during the face-to-face interview. Standards are indicated by the
reported minimum acceptable quality levels of cleaning, cooking, and child
care, which range from 1 to 10 (1 = low output standard; 10 = task has to
be done perfectly). Quality standards are, not surprisingly, especially high
for child care: Parents indicated a minimum level of child care of nearly
8.41 for women and 8.08 for men on a 10-point scale. Unfortunately, sim-
ilar information was not available for home maintenance. Again, quadratic
terms were included if significant.
The household’s general level of trust was measured with the follow-
ing six items from Yamagishi’s trust scale (Yamagishi, 1986; Yamagishi
& Sato, 1986): (a) In dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious
until evidence has been provided that the stranger is trustworthy, (b) in
these competitive times, one has to be careful, or someone will take
advantage of you, (c) one should not trust others until one knows them
well, (d) most people will tell you a lie if they can benefit by doing so,
(e) if someone gives you a compliment, it is because they want some-
thing from you, and (f) given the opportunity, people are dishonest. Both
partners replied to each of these items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
to 5 (1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree). The items were then
added. The Cronbach’s α, indicating the reliability of the scale, was .83
for both female and male partners. A higher value on the scale indicates
a higher level of trust. Again, we tested for nonlinear effects with qua-
dratic terms.
We controlled for age of the respondent (continuous variable) and the
highest education level in the household (11 categories, varying from
1 = no preliminary education to 11 = PhD, MD). The net monthly house-
hold income (in thousands of euros) and a dummy variable indicating home
ownership were also included.
Because three of the dependent variables are dichotomous (whether or
not a task is outsourced), logistic regression models were estimated for the
outsourcing of home maintenance, domestic help, and child care. Ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression models were estimated for the number of
16 Journal of Family Issues
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times per month that alternatives for cooking were used. As a consequence
of the multistage sample, the households in the sample were clustered in 30
organizations. The standard errors in the regression models were modified
for clustering of the observations (Rogers, 1993).
Results
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for our dependent variables appear in Table 1. In
total, 74% of all households had outsourced maintenance in the preceding
year. Of all households in the sample, 39% hired domestic help and 80% of
the households with children made use of forms of child care. On average,
the households used alternatives for home cooking approximately seven
times per month.
Multivariate Analyses
Table 2 presents the results of the multivariate analyses explaining the
use of outsourcing alternatives for cleaning, home maintenance, child care,
and cooking. For the dichotomous dependent variables (home maintenance,
domestic help, and child care), odds ratios are presented. For the model
explaining the number of times per month that alternatives for cooking are
used, unstandardized OLS regression coefficients are presented.
Cleaning
We find little evidence that time availability and demand capability
influence the use of cleaning services (Table 2). Double earners are some-
what more likely to outsource housecleaning than single earners, but one-
and-a-half earners are not. With respect to women’s share in domestic
work, we find that more specialized households are less likely to outsource
cleaning. The presence of children under the age of 13 does increase the
likelihood of outsourcing cleaning.
Couples in which the male partner is able to work from home are signif-
icantly more likely to outsource cleaning. This finding is surprising because
we mainly expected an effect of working from home by women, because
cleaning is traditionally a female task. Women’s flexible work schedule
increases the likelihood of outsourcing cleaning as expected, but skills do
not influence the outsourcing of cleaning. Apparently, skilled people are not
de Ruijter, van der Lippe / Trust Problems and Household Differences 17
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Table 1
Outsourcing Behavior, Benefits of Outsourcing
Indicators, Trust Problem Indicators, and Control
Variables: Descriptive Statistics (N = 740)
Variable M SD Range
Outsourcing of cleaninga 0.39 0.49 0-1
Outsourcing of home maintenancea 0.74 0.44 0-1
Outsourcing of child carea 0.80 0.40 0-1
Outsourcing of cooking 6.81 5.80 0-48
Employment status
Double earnerb 0.35 0.48 0-1
One-and-a-half earnerc 0.47 0.50 0-1
Single earnerd 0.13 0.34 0-1
Share of female partner in household work 62.22 15.29 4.03-100
Number of children under age 13g 0.86 1.00 0-4
Female partner
Working from homee 0.07 0.26 0-1
Flexible work schedule 2.62 1.39 0-4
Cleaning skills 7.76 1.18 1-10
Home maintenance skills 6.23 1.69 1-10
Child care skills 8.32 0.94 1-10
Cooking skills 7.67 1.20 1-10
Cleaning quality standards 7.26 1.14 1-10
Child care quality standards 8.41 0.99 1-10
Cooking quality standards 7.53 1.24 1-10
General level of trust 20.28 3.92 6-30
Male partner
Working from homee 0.11 0.31 0-1
Flexible work schedule 3.01 1.12 0-4
Cleaning skills 6.64 1.63 1-10
Home maintenance skills 7.23 1.60 1-10
Child care skills 7.94 1.16 1-10
Cooking skills 7.04 1.78 1-10
Cleaning quality standards 6.91 1.25 1-10
Child care quality standards 8.08 1.08 1-10
Cooking quality standards 7.41 1.28 1-10
General level of trust 19.26 4.17 7-30
Highest education level 8.54 1.88 2-11
Monthly income (in thousands of euros) 3.02 1.60 1-14.69
Home ownershipf 0.83 0.38 0-1
Age of respondent 41.50 8.56 23-62
a. Outsourcing of cleaning, home maintenance, child care: 0 = no outsourcing; 1 = outsourcing.
b. Double earner: 0 = other earner types; 1 = double earner.
c. One-and-a-half earner: 0 = other earner types; 1 = one-and-a-half earner.
d. Single earner: 0 = other earner types; 1 = single earner.
e. Working from home: 0 = (almost) never works from home; 1 = occasionally works from home.
f. Home-ownership: 0 = no home-owner; 1 = home-owner.
g. n = 323.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
more likely to outsource because they can perform certain tasks themselves
at a relatively low price. Another explanation could be that all households
can easily judge cleaning, regardless of skills. Quality standards also do not
influence the likelihood of outsourcing cleaning. An explanation for this
finding could be that poor-quality cleaning does not involve high costs for
households, even if they have high standards. In addition, only a relatively
small investment has to be made in explaining how they want things done,
which can be used throughout the outsourcing relation. Households may
have to invest a few hours in the beginning, but this does not outweigh the
advantage of having help thereafter. We find the expected effect for the gen-
eral level of trust: If the female partner is more trusting, couples are more
likely to outsource cleaning.
Home Maintenance
No clear expectation was formulated about the effect of earner type on the
outsourcing of home maintenance, because home maintenance is a discre-
tionary task. More specialized households are less likely to outsource home
maintenance, and having more children under age 13 decreases outsourcing.
Working from home does not influence the likelihood of outsourcing
maintenance. As expected, the job flexibility of the male partner increases the
likelihood of outsourcing maintenance. The influence of skills reveals an
interesting gender pattern. For men’s maintenance skills, higher skills
decrease the likelihood of outsourcing—probably because it is more efficient
for skilled men to perform chores themselves. For women, the trust argument
applies. The higher the skills of the female partner, the more likely the cou-
ple will outsource maintenance. The effect declines but remains positive.
Whereas skilled men perform maintenance tasks to show their masculinity,
skilled women use their skills to hire someone because they are able to judge
the quality. As expected, the more strongly men feel that other people cannot
be trusted, the less likely they are to outsource home maintenance.
Child Care
Couples with two working partners are indeed more likely to outsource
child care than single-earner couples. With respect to the other indicators of
the benefits of outsourcing, it appears that women’s share in domestic work
has no effect but that the number of children is important.
Working from home by women decreases the likelihood of outsourcing
child care. Women working from home use the time they are at home to
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take care of the children themselves rather than to monitor the supplier,
because direct monitoring would make outsourcing unnecessary. A flexible
work schedule of the female partner increases the likelihood of outsourc-
ing, although not for reasons of monitoring. A flexible schedule of the
female partner facilitates using outsourcing alternatives for child care,
because day care centers often have strict opening hours.
Couples in which men have greater child care skills are more likely to
use outsourcing. Similar to our findings for home maintenance, we find the
expected effect of skills for other-gender tasks instead of own-gender tasks.
The results are similar for quality standards; men’s quality standards have
the expected negative effect on the outsourcing of child care. The effect
declines but remains negative. The general level of trust of the female part-
ner appears to be important for the decision whether to have an outsider tak-
ing care of the children, as expected. The effect declines yet stays positive.
Cooking
There are no significant differences in the outsourcing of cooking between
different earner types. For cooking, we find the expected negative effect of
women’s specialization in household tasks. Not surprisingly, the number of
children decreases the use of outsourcing alternatives for cooking.
Men with flexible work schedules seem to use their flexibility to pur-
chase outsourcing alternatives for cooking. Greater cooking skills of the
female partner, indicating the ability to monitor quality, decrease the out-
sourcing of cooking. Perhaps experienced cooks are generally not con-
vinced of the good quality of outsourcing alternatives and are more
confident about the quality of their own cooking. In addition, cooking skills
decrease the relative costs of own cooking and make outsourcing less
attractive. Women with high quality standards are less likely to outsource
cooking, as expected. The general level of trust does not influence the out-
sourcing of cooking.
Discussion
Household outsourcing is an important strategy for households to deal
with the competing demands from work and home. Previous research
mainly studied whether dual-earner couples use outsourcing as a time-
saving strategy, with limited support. These studies typically fail to con-
sider how trust problems affect the outsourcing behavior of households.
We argue that trust problems matter in outsourcing decisions, because an
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outsider, who is generally less concerned with the household’s welfare,
enters the privacy of the household and takes over tasks of special value.
Because gender is a key concept in studies of household labor, we studied
how trust influences outsourcing of both female and male tasks from a
gender perspective.
Regarding the benefits of outsourcing as a time-saving strategy, our results
show some differences between dual and single earners in their outsourcing
behavior. Dual earners are more likely to outsource child care and also more
likely to outsource cleaning, but we found no differences for cooking.
Possibly, larger differences between earner types would have been found if
our sample did not overrepresent dual-earner couples. We found that special-
ization, as indicated by women’s share in domestic work, decreases outsourc-
ing to some extent. In these households, there is a fixed division of labor that
reduces the need to outsource cleaning, home maintenance, and cooking. The
number of children increases the likelihood of outsourcing cleaning and child
care yet reduces the outsourcing of home maintenance and cooking.
We found convincing evidence for our hypothesis that the general level of
trust increases the likelihood of outsourcing own-gender tasks. The level of gen-
eral trust of the female partner influences the outsourcing of child care and
cleaning, whereas the male partner’s trust in others influences the outsourcing of
home maintenance. With respect to cooking, general trust is of less relevance.
Only if the privacy of the home is involved, actual entry in the home is made, or
in the case of valuable tasks does trust become a significant determinant of
household decision making. Our findings are similar to results from the experi-
mental study by Yamagishi and associates (1998), which revealed that general
trust is an emancipator of people from the confines of safe relationships.
Our results revealed interesting gendered patterns in couples’ outsourcing
behavior. Because job flexibility facilitates observation of the outsourcing sup-
plier, we expected that more flexibility of partners facilitates outsourcing of
own-gender tasks. Indeed, more flexible work schedules of the female part-
ner increase the likelihood of outsourcing cleaning and child care, whereas
men’s flexible work schedules facilitate the outsourcing of home mainte-
nance. Interestingly, although cleaning and cooking are considered female
tasks, couples in which the male partner has a flexible job are more likely to
outsource cleaning and cooking. Working from home by men increases the
outsourcing of cleaning. Men use this opportunity to outsource and women
do not, probably because they feel uncomfortable being at home with some-
one else doing “their” work (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001), and uncomfortable
outsourcing when they have more flexibility to do the work themselves. Men
apparently do not experience this uncomfortable feeling.
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Interestingly, partners are less likely to outsource own-gender tasks and
more likely to outsource other-gender tasks if they are more skilled. Similarly,
we found that partners’ quality standards influence the outsourcing of other-
gender tasks. For home maintenance and cooking, we found evidence for the
production cost argument in the explanation of outsourcing own-gender tasks:
The costs of own household labor are lower for skilled persons and therefore
they are more inclined to take the responsibility for own-gender tasks. For
other-gender tasks, the trust argument is confirmed for home maintenance and
child care. Greater skills facilitate outsourcing because skills allow people to
judge the quality of the outsourcing service, which reduces the trust problem.
Even though it would be economically efficient to perform other-gender tasks
in terms of production costs, men and women display gender-linked behaviors
and choose to outsource tasks instead of performing other-gender tasks if they
are skilled in other-gender tasks. Even if they are highly skilled, men avoid
performing women’s chores whereas women avoid stereotypically male
chores and choose to outsource. That gender considerations are more impor-
tant than arguments of economic efficiency is not a new idea (Brines, 1994).
Husbands earning less than their wife are not willing to take on a larger share
of domestic work (Brines, 1994). Our study confirms the gendered nature of
outsourcing decisions, as already suggested by the different income effects
found by Oropesa (1993) and Cohen (1998). Similarly, research by de Ruijter
and associates (2005) revealed that men and women respond to different influ-
ences in their outsourcing behavior.
Our data have provided the opportunity to test new hypotheses because
they contain measures of outsourcing behavior, the division of housework,
as well as extensive measures of trust problems. However, dual earners as
well as higher educated people are overrepresented in our sample. The lim-
ited variation in earner types in our sample may explain why we found lim-
ited evidence for the hypotheses concerning the benefits of outsourcing. In
addition, we have restricted ourselves to the analysis of couples’ outsourc-
ing decisions. Further research is needed to study how trust problems influ-
ence the outsourcing behavior of single men and women. Because they do
not have a partner of the opposite sex to fall back on for other-gender tasks,
the outsourcing demand is especially high for opposite-gender tasks.
However, they might be confronted with substantial trust problems in the
outsourcing of these tasks, assuming that they are less able to judge the out-
put than for own-gender tasks. Finally, it would be interesting to study how
easy and affordable it is to obtain a reliable supplier. For instance, how easy
is it to locate high-quality, affordable child care? The lack of availability
and affordability will ultimately decide if it is even possible to outsource.
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